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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EQUAL 
TREATMENT: A UNITED KINGDOM 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
Karon Monaghan QC 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Religious discrimination is institutionalized in the United 
Kingdom.1 The Church of England occupies a privileged space in 
the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. The Queen, as 
a constitutional monarch, holds the title “defender of the Faith 
and Supreme Governor of the Church of England.”2 Twenty-six 
Bishops of the Church of England3 sit in the legislature’s upper 
house, the House of Lords.4 The position of these “Lords 
                                                          
* Barrister, Matrix Chambers, Griffin Building, Gray’s Inn, London, United 
Kingdom WC1R 5LN, +44 (0)20 7404 3447, karonmonaghan@ 
matrixlaw.co.uk. Author of KARON MONAGHAN QC, MONAGHAN ON 
EQUALITY LAW (2d ed. 2013). 
1 New constitutional settlements with Wales, Scotland, and Northern 
Ireland have devolved specified matters to regional assemblies but Parliament 
retains responsibility for certain matters and the fundamental constitutional 
arrangements remain in place (subject to referenda in the case of Scotland and 
Northern Ireland). Government of Wales Act, 1998, c. 38; Government of 
Wales Act, 2006, c. 26; Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, §1, sch. 5; Northern 
Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, §§ 1–4, sch. 3. 
2 Queen and the Church of England, THE BRIT. MONARCHY, 
http://www.royal.gov.uk/MonarchUK/QueenandChurch/QueenandtheChurcho
fEngland.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).   
3 All Bishops are men as the Church of England does not allow women in 
the episcopate (that is, to become Bishops). 
4 The number of Bishops is limited to twenty-six. Bishops in the House of 
Lords, THE CHURCH OF ENG., http://www.churchofengland.org/our-views/the-
church-in-parliament/bishops-in-the-house-of-lords.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 
2014); How Do You Become a Member of the House of Lords?, U.K. 
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Spiritual” is unique: no representatives from other religious 
organizations are entitled as of right to membership of the House 
of Lords.5 
These facts establish the United Kingdom as an essentially 
Christian State,6 and this is reflected in a number of legal 
measures. For example, education law in the United Kingdom 
requires that every pupil take part in a daily act of collective 
worship, which must be wholly or mainly of a broadly Christian 
character.7 It is difficult to understand why this state of affairs is 
tolerated in an apparently modern, pluralistic, liberal democracy. 
However, notwithstanding the wide-ranging constitutional 
reforms put into place by the last Labour Government,8 the right 
                                                          
PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/about/mps-and-lords/about-lords/ 
lords-appointment/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). Presently, there are only 
twenty-three Lords Spiritual. Lords by Party, Type of Peerage and Gender, 
PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/lords/ 
composition-of-the-lords/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). It is customary for one 
of the Lords Spiritual to read prayers in the House at the beginning of each 
day’s proceedings, and for this purpose a rota is furnished to the House in 
which certain of the Lords Spiritual are allotted periods for which they are 
responsible for this duty. See  78 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND, para. 833 
(5th ed. 2010). 
5 Bishops in the House of Lords, supra note 4.  
6 David Cameron, Prime Minister, has declared of the United Kingdom: 
“We are a Christian country[,] and we should not be afraid to say so.” David 
Cameron Says the UK is a Christian Country, BBC NEWS (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16224394?. 
7 School Standards and Framework Act, 1998, c. 31, § 70 (UK) (stating 
that all students in attendance must take part in collective worship). “Collective 
worship is of a broadly Christian character if it reflects the broad traditions of 
Christian belief without being distinctive of any particular Christian 
denomination.” Id. sch. 20. A parent may request that a pupil be wholly or 
partly excused from receiving religious education and the pupil may be so 
excused. Id. § 71(1).  The 1998 Act does not apply to Scotland. Id. § 145. For 
Scotland, see SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT CIRCULAR, PROVISION OF RELIGIOUS 
OBSERVANCE IN SCOTTISH SCHOOLS (2005). 
8 See House of Lords Act, 1999, c. 34 (restricting membership of the 
House of Lords by virtue of a hereditary peerage); Constitutional Reform Act, 
2005, c.4 (formally separating the state’s judicial and legislative functions by 
the creation of a Supreme Court and making consequential changes). See also 
Government of Wales Act, 1998, c. 38; Government of Wales Act, 2006, c. 
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of senior Church of England Bishops to sit in the House of Lords 
was retained and no changes were made upsetting the primacy of 
Christianity, and the Church of England in particular, in public 
life.9   
This privileging of Christianity over other religious or 
nonreligious beliefs has, until recently, been aggravated by the 
absence of any legal protections against religious and belief-based 
discrimination.10 Certain “religious” groups have for some time 
been legally categorized as “ethnic groups.”11 By this route, 
certain religious minorities discriminated against because of their 
religious beliefs have enjoyed the protection of laws against race 
discrimination,12 but by and large discrimination connected to 
religion and belief remained outside of the law. In school and at 
                                                          
26; Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46; Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47 (redefining 
the relationship between the three constituent countries of the United Kingdom 
and between Northern Ireland and Great Britain). 
9 See generally DEP’T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION 
PAPER, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: NEXT STEPS FOR THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
(2003). 
10 The position was somewhat different in Northern Ireland because of its 
particular political context. See Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern 
Ireland) Order, 1998, SI 1998/3162 (N. Ir. 21), arts. 2–4, 74 (addressing 
discrimination connected to religious belief and political opinion, and 
affirmative action). 
11 Seide v. Gillette Indus. Ltd., [1980] I.R.L.R. 427 (Jews); Mandla v. 
Dowell Lee, [1983] 2 A.C. 548 (Sikhs). These cases recognize the relationship 
between culture and religion: many people belonging to particular racial 
groups see their religion as occupying more of a cultural or political space in 
their lives, and “faith” as less significant to their identity. In Northern Ireland, 
therefore, where there has been compelling protection against discrimination 
connected with religion and belief in employment and related fields for some 
time, it is well understood that these protections were passed to address the 
political and cultural, rather than the theological, divides between the Catholic 
and Protestant communities. See generally Fair Employment and Treatment 
(Northern Ireland) Order, 1998, SI 1998/3162 (N. Ir. 21). 
12 This caused a good deal of controversy. When promoting new laws 
addressing religious discrimination, the Lord Chancellor observed that this 
“remedie[d] the anomaly whereby members of some religions are protected 
against discrimination in the provision of goods, facilities and services, but 
members of other religion or belief groups are not.” Michael Rubenstein, 
Equality Act 2006: A Guide, 151 EQUAL OPPORTUNITY REV. 21, 25 (2006). 
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work, therefore, working hours, holidays, dress codes, and the 
like were generally constructed around a Christian norm free 
from the scrutiny of equality law, sometimes causing real 
disadvantage to those holding non-Christian beliefs.13 
The distinction between those religious groups deemed ethnic 
groups and those not, meant that laws outlawing the incitement of 
racial hatred protected some religious groups but not others.14 At 
the same time, the (now abolished)15 common law offense of 
blasphemy protected Christians only against certain forms of 
insult. Blasphemy was an indictable offense at common law 
consisting of the publication of any “contemptuous, reviling, 
scurrilous or ludicrous matter relating to God, Jesus Christ, or 
the Bible or the formularies of the Church of England.”16 No 
comparable protection was afforded to other religious groups.  
This disparity was ameliorated by a series of legislative 
measures. First, the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) 
Regulations 2003 made discrimination connected with a person’s 
religion or belief unlawful in employment and related fields.17  
Second, Part 2 of the Equality Act 2006 outlawed discrimination 
connected to religion and belief in the provision of goods, 
facilities, and services; in the disposal and management of 
premises; in education; and by public authorities.18 While these 
laws have now been revoked and repealed, respectively, they 
have been largely consolidated and are now reflected in near-
                                                          
13 Ahmad v. Inner London Educ. Auth., [1978] Q.B. 36, 40–41; Ahmad 
v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 66911/09, and 
67354/09, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. 27, para. 12 (1982). 
14 Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, § 18 (UK). 
15 See Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 1998, c. 4, § 79 (1) (UK).   
16 Whitehouse v. Lemon & Gay News Ltd., [1979] AC 617 (H.L.) 665 
(appeal taken from Eng.). 
17 The Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations, 2003, S.I. 
2003/1660, §§ 3, 6 (UK). These regulations covered employees, contract 
workers, officer holders, the police, barristers, advocates, partnerships, trade 
organizations, qualifications bodies, providers of vocational training, 
employment agencies, career guidance services and further and higher 
education institutions. 
18 Equality Act, 2006, c. 3, §§ 44–80 (UK). 
2014.05.07 MONAGHAN.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:24 AM 
 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND EQUAL TREATMENT 677 
identical provisions in the Equality Act 2010.19 Third, the Racial 
and Religious Hatred Act 2006 now criminalizes “threatening 
words or behavior, or displays [of] any written material which is 
threatening” if the person so acting “intends thereby to stir up 
religious hatred.”20 These measures were directed at securing 
greater equality for minority religious belief-holders, and for 
those without any religious belief at all.21 However, all of them 
have proved controversial. 
The extension of the hate speech provisions to religious hatred 
was highly contentious. It led to a campaign by well-known 
comedians and others concerned about the censoring of religious 
criticism, whether that criticism was through satire or 
otherwise.22 However, the difficulty faced by those resisting this 
change was that some forms of religious criticism were already 
outlawed by race hate and blasphemy laws, but only in the case 
of certain religions. This discriminatory distinction had a 
pernicious effect on nonprotected religious groups who suffered 
the public ignominy of apparently legally sanctioned second class 
status and was plainly difficult to justify. In an environment of 
increased hostility towards Muslims, in particular, a position 
where the law protected Christians but left Muslims unprotected 
was simply unsustainable.  The comedians and their protagonists 
did not succeed in their attempts to have these new laws 
criminalizing religious hate speech blocked, and the 
discrimination inherent in hate speech laws that protected some 
religious groups but not others was eliminated. 
The most controversial protections have proved to be those 
conferring nondiscrimination rights on those who have been 
disadvantaged because of their religion or belief. This is because 
such protection, perhaps inevitably, extends beyond 
disadvantages associated with the holding of a particular belief, to 
religiously motivated acts. The problem is not that a Christian, a 
                                                          
19 Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, pts. 2–14 (UK) and associated Schedules. 
20 Racial and Religious Hatred Act, 2006, c. 1, § 29B(1), sch. 1 (UK) 
(amending the Public Order Act 1986, c. 64 (UK)). 
21  Id. § 29A. 
22 Atkinson’s Religious Hate Worry, BBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2004), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4073997.stm. 
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Muslim, or a Jew, as the case may be, can call on the protection 
of antidiscrimination law when discriminated against because they 
adhere to particular religious beliefs. Instead, it is that they may 
rely on those same laws for license to act in ways said to be in 
pursuance of those beliefs.  Sometimes this is uncontroversial. A 
woman who wishes to wear a crucifix at work, absent any 
specific and compelling requirements of the job, can easily be 
accommodated, as can a turban-wearing Sikh, or a Muslim 
seeking to observe prayers on certain days of the week.23 More 
problematic, and increasingly so given changes in United 
Kingdom and regional antidiscrimination and human rights law, 
are those cases where the assertion of a religious belief through 
practice impinges on the rights of others, particularly women and 
sexual minorities.  It is this issue that is the focus of this Article.  
Section II of this Article will identify the various legal 
measures operating in the United Kingdom that confer the right to 
religious freedom and the right to freedom of religious 
expression. Section III examines the way in which competing 
rights, particularly those affecting women and sexual minorities, 
are managed within those legal frameworks. Section IV concludes 
that both statutory law and case law afford considerable 
protection to religious groups and individuals within them, 
sometimes at the expense of otherwise highly protected classes, 
women and sexual minorities in particular. This occurs 
notwithstanding that in practice those religious groups, 
specifically Christians, who most commonly claim such 
protections against the interests of women and sexual minorities, 
can in no sense be regarded as forming a “minority” or as being 
socially or structurally disadvantaged.  
 
II.  FREEDOM OF RELIGION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
There are four main sources of legal protection against 
discrimination connected to religious belief in the United 
                                                          
23 See Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 
51671/10, and 3516/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881. 
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Kingdom.  These derive from the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and its effective 
transposition into United Kingdom domestic law through the 
Human Rights Act 1998, European Union law, and the United 
Kingdom’s Equality Act 2010. These legal protections originate 
from varied historical and political imperatives and, though they 
inform each other, offer discrete routes to protection, and address 
religious freedoms and nondiscrimination rights differently.  
These measures guarantee the right to freedom of religion and 
provide compelling protection against religious discrimination. 
The right to freedom of religion, as protected by these laws, is 
not restricted to the enjoyment of the right to freedom of 
conscience (the so-called “forum internum”),24 but also to the 
right to manifest religious belief (the so-called “forum 
externum”). These same laws also provide protection to women 
and sexual minorities against discrimination. The rights 
guaranteeing religious freedoms and the dignity and equality 
rights of women and sexual minorities, in particular, can on 
occasions conflict. The method by which the coexistence of these 
rights is managed in an increasingly diverse and pluralistic 
society varies, but in the case of each of the legal schemes 
addressed below, resolving such conflicts is complex and 
controversial. 
 
A.  European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 
 
1. Religious Freedom 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (“ECHR”),25 to which all Member States of the 
Council of Europe are party,26 contains provisions addressing 
                                                          
24 See C. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10358/83, 37 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 142, para. 147 (1983). 
25 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 230 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
26 New members are expected to ratify the ECHR at the earliest 
opportunity. See EUR. PARL. ASS., Resolution 1031 (1994). 
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religious freedom, and nondiscrimination.  This reflects the 
origins of the ECHR, which is firmly rooted in the atrocities of 
the Second World War.27 The ECHR was a response to the 
horrors perpetrated against the Jews, and the commitment to 
preventing the repeat of any such genocide. Such commitment 
provided the impetus for embedding the rights and freedoms 
addressing both religion and nondiscrimination in a legally 
binding instrument.   
As history demonstrates, there can be a close relationship 
between religion and race.  This is especially true in Europe 
where religion has often been used as a proxy for race. This is 
evident from the commission of crimes against humanity in 
Europe, including the atrocities of the Second World War and 
those after, specifically the “ethnic cleansing” and genocide of 
Bosnian Muslims under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević. It 
is also apparent from the rise of political parties across Europe 
promoting an anti-Islamic discourse.28 The need for robust 
protections against religious discrimination cannot, therefore, be 
doubted.  
The specific provision in the ECHR directed at protecting 
religious freedom confers the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion as well as the right to manifest religion 
                                                          
27 For more information, see generally DAVID HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF 
THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2009). 
28 “In the last two decades, parties promoting an anti-Islam discourse have 
had sufficient electoral success to be represented in the national parliaments of 
a considerable number of European countries including Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland.” 
AMNESTY INT’L, CHOICE AND PREJUDICE: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST 
MUSLIMS IN EUROPE 15 (2012). The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for 
Human Rights has noted that: “[O]pinion polls in several European Countries 
reflect fear, suspicion and negative opinions of Muslims and Islamic culture. 
These Islamophobic prejudices are combined with racist attitudes—directed not 
least against people originating from Turkey, Arab countries and South Asia.” 
Thomas Hammarberg, European Muslims are Stigmatised by Populist 
Rhetoric, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMENT (Oct. 28, 2010, 9:19 AM), 
http://commissioner.cws.coe.int/tiki-view_blog_post.php?postId=99; see also 
Islamophobia Watch: Documenting Anti Muslim Bigotry, ISLAMOPHOBIA-
WATCH.COM, http://www.islamophobia-watch.com/islamophobia-watch/cate 
gory/uk (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
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or belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and observance.29 In the 
latter case, that freedom is qualified. An interference with the 
right to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be justified where 
certain criteria are met, in particular where the interference 
pursues one of a list of enumerated aims and is proportionate.30  
Unsurprisingly given its provenance, the European Court of 
Human Rights (“ECtHR”), the ultimate arbiter of disputes under 
the ECHR, regards the guarantee of freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion, enshrined in the ECHR, as “one of the 
foundations of a ‘democratic society.’”31 
The religious freedoms protected by the ECHR are broad 
because, for good reason, the concept of “religion” is not 
prescribed. Subject to certain minimum criteria being met, 
whether a belief is protected under the ECHR is generally not a 
question for the secular courts. To permit one branch or another 
of the State to delineate those beliefs worthy of respect and those 
not, would be to raise just the dangers that recent history shows 
                                                          
29 ECHR, supra note 25, art. 9. This is the only Convention provision that 
may be relied upon by an organization, as well as an individual. See Church of 
Scientology Moscow v. Russia, App. No. 18147/08, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. 16, 
para. 81 (2008); Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Cmty. v. Bulgaria, 41 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, para. 74 (2005). 
30 ECHR, supra note 25, art. 9(2) (“Freedom to manifest one’s religion or 
beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and 
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others.”); see also R (SB) v. Governors of Denbigh High 
Sch., [2006] UKHL 15, [20]–[32]. 
31 Sahin v. Turkey, 2005-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 175. There are hints, 
however, of a privileging here of Christianity over Islam. Compare 
Karaduman v. Turkey, 74 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep 93 (1993) (holding 
that there was no interference with the rights guaranteed by Article 9 when a 
University failed to award the applicant, a Muslim, a diploma because she 
refused to produce a photograph of her herself without her headscarf), with 
Lautsi v. Italy, 54 Eur. H.R. Rep. 3 (2012) (holding that the presence of 
crucifixes in State-school class rooms did not violate Article 9), with Eweida 
v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, and 3516/10, 
2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=001-115881 (holding that the applicant’s rights under Article 9 
were violated when she was prohibited from wearing a crucifix at work). 
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still exist. Instead, the court will generally ask only whether the 
belief in question is sincerely held.  Similarly, whether any act is 
a “manifestation” of such a sincerely held religious belief is, in 
the usual case, to be adjudged by the believer herself. The courts 
do not engage in any assessment of the validity of the belief that 
is said to drive the actions (or “manifestation”) in issue; they ask 
only whether an individual genuinely holds that belief.32 This sets 
a low threshold for the purposes of determining whether a belief 
is protected by the ECHR. According to the ECtHR:  
[t]he right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion denotes views that attain a certain level of 
cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance . . . . Provided this is satisfied, the 
State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality is 
incompatible with any power on the State’s part to 
assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs or the 
ways in which those beliefs are expressed.33  
In particular, it is not necessary or appropriate for the court to 
question the extent to which other members of the religious group 
to which a person belongs, and to membership of which they 
attribute the belief in question, subscribe to that belief or engage 
in that expression. The answers to any such questions are not 
relevant in deciding whether that person herself has such a belief, 
nor are they relevant to whether the belief can be categorized as 
                                                          
32 R (Williamson) v. Sec’y of State for Educ. & Emp’t, [2005] 2 A.C. 
246 (H.L.) [22]–[23] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
33 Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. (citations omitted). In addition to 
mainstream religious belief, the European Convention institutions have been 
prepared to assume that more minority beliefs are covered by Article 9, 
including a belief in the Divine Light Zentrum, Omkaranda and the Divine 
Light Zentrum v. Switzerland, App. No. 8118/77, 25 Eur. Comm’n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 105 (1981); Druidism, Chappell v. United Kingdom, App. No. 
1046/83, 3 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 241 (1987); and Scientology, X 
& Church of Scientology v. Sweden, App. No. 7805/77, 16 Eur. Comm’n 
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 68, 69 (1979); Church of Scientology Moscow v. Russia, 
App. No. 18147/02, 46 Eur. Ct. H.R. 16 (2008). For a recent consideration of 
scientology by the Supreme Court of the U.K., see generally R (Hodkin) v. 
Registrar General Births, Deaths & Marriages, [2013] UKSC 77 (appeal taken 
from High Court). 
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“religious.” This approach ensures that the religious freedoms 
guaranteed by the Convention are given very wide reach.  
The ECtHR has acknowledged that even in cases where the 
religious belief asserted meets the necessary threshold, not “every 
act which is in some way inspired, motivated, or influenced by it 
constitutes a ‘manifestation’ of the belief. Thus, for example, acts 
or omissions which do not directly express the belief concerned 
or which are only remotely connected to a precept of faith” are 
not protected.34 Nevertheless, the right to manifest religious belief 
is broad: there need only be “the existence of a sufficiently close 
and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief . . . . 
In particular, there is no requirement on the applicant to establish 
that he or she acted in fulfillment of a duty mandated by the 
religion in question.”35 This has particular ramifications for acts 
done in pursuance of religious beliefs that discriminate against 
others, usually women and sexual minorities.36  
In addition to explicit guarantees relating to freedom of 
religion, the ECHR contains an open-textured equality clause,37 
triggered when any complaint falls within the scope of one or 
another of the substantive Convention rights.38 These include, for 
example, the privacy provision,39 which has historically been 
used to protect the rights of sexual minorities,40 and the family 
                                                          
34 Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 82.  
35 Id. 
36 Children are also often affected, though consideration of this impact is 
outside the scope of this Article. 
37 ECHR, supra note 25, art. 14 (“The enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination 
on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, 
property, birth or other status.”). 
38 See id. arts. 2–13; protocol no. 1, arts. 1–3; protocol no. 4, arts. 1–4; 
protocol no. 6, arts. 1–2; protocol no. 7, arts. 1–5; protocol no. 7, arts. 1–5; 
protocol no. 12, art. 1 (which contains a free standing nondiscrimination right 
but which is neither signed nor ratified by the United Kingdom); protocol no. 
13, art. 1. 
39 Id. art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private . . . life.”). 
40  See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 126 (1981) 
(holding that the criminalizing of homosexual acts between consenting adults 
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life provision.41 This clause gives wide meaning to the concept of 
“discrimination,” so as to address not merely formal distinctions 
in treatment, but also structural and institutional forms of 
inequality.42 It covers discrimination on the basis of a long list of 
enumerated grounds, including sex and religion, and “other 
status,” which has long since been held to be sufficiently 
                                                          
was a breach of Article 8); Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
449 (1999); Smith v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493 (1999) (holding 
that the investigation into and subsequent discharge of personnel from the 
Armed Forces on the basis that they were homosexual was a breach of Article 
8); A.D.T. v. United Kingdom, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 33 (2001) (holding that 
legislation criminalizing homosexual acts between men in private, and a 
fortiori prosecution and conviction, was a breach of Article 8); Goodwin v. 
United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 447 (2002) (holding that a failure to grant 
legal recognition of a person’s gender re-assignment was a breach of Article 
8). Domestically, courts have recognized similar rights. See, e.g., Ghaidan v. 
Ghodin-Mendoza, [2004] 2 A.C. 557 (H.L.) (holding that tenancy succession 
rules which treated survivors of homosexual partnerships less favorably than 
survivors of heterosexual partnerships breached Articles 8 and 14). 
41 Schalk v. Austria, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. (holding that the 
relationship between a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto 
partnership, fell within the notion of “family life,” just as the relationship of a 
different-sex couple in the same situation would). 
42  See, e.g., Jordan v. United Kingdom, 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2003) 
(a general policy or measure that has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a 
particular group, may be considered discriminatory notwithstanding that it is 
not specifically aimed or directed at that group and breach Article 14); 
Thlimmenos v. Greece, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 411 (2000) (the right not to be 
discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights under the ECHR is also 
violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification fail to 
treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different); D.H. v. 
Czech Republic, 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. 3 (2008) (a breach of Article 14 may occur 
where a general policy or measure which, though couched in neutral terms, 
results in disproportionately prejudicial effects against a group); Opuz v. 
Turkey, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 695 (2010) (holding that general and discriminatory 
judicial passivity in Turkey on the issue of domestic violence, albeit 
unintentional, mainly affected women and the violence could therefore be 
regarded as gender-based violence and a form of discrimination against 
women, and that in the circumstances, the overall unresponsiveness of the 
judicial system and impunity enjoyed by the aggressors indicated that there was 
insufficient commitment to take appropriate action to address domestic 
violence and this amounted to a breach of Article 14). 
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expansive to cover sexual orientation.43 The prohibition on 
discriminatory treatment appears absolute, but the courts have 
approached the interpretation of the equality clause on the 
assumption that it implicitly allows for the justification of 
discrimination. For any discrimination to be lawful, however, it 
must be objectively and reasonably justified. The level of scrutiny 
applied to any discriminatory act or measure for the purposes of 
determining whether it is justified will reflect the social and legal 
importance placed upon the relevant distinguishing characteristic.  
Distinctions based on “suspect” grounds, those being, inter alia, 
religion,44 sex,45 and sexual orientation,46 will be subject to 
particularly rigorous scrutiny and will require “very weighty 
reasons”47 if they are to be justified.   
The scheme of the ECHR with its broad protections 
promotes, or should promote, respect for diversity and for a 
plurality of divergent beliefs. Difficulties arise, however, because 
the guarantees of freedom of religion and the prohibition on 
discrimination may be used by members of more than one suspect 
class with respect to the same act. This typically occurs when the 
act in issue discriminates against women or sexual minorities, but 
the proscribing of it discriminates against those holding particular 
religious beliefs. While the possibility of justifying what would 
otherwise be prohibited discrimination seems to be the obvious 
route by which such conflicts might be resolved, this results in 
uncertainty. Where the balance will be struck in any particular 
case can be hard to predict and will sometimes depend upon 
unknowable factors, such as the personal views of the judge 
hearing the case. Further, little guidance can be found in the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence because of its reliance on the “margin of 
appreciation.”48   
                                                          
43 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 47 (1999). 
44 Hoffmann v. Austria, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 293, 316 (1993). 
45 Van Raalte v. The Netherlands, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 503, 518–19 (1997). 
46 Vejdeland v. Sweden, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 369; E.B. v. France, 47 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 41 (2008). 
47 Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 471 (1985). 
48 For a full discussion, see generally R. CLAYTON & H. TOMLINSON, THE 
LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 6.42 (2d ed. 2009). 
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In essence, the doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” 
affords Member States a degree of latitude in their compliance 
with the Convention rights, reflecting the principle of 
subsidiarity49 and the ECtHR’s cognizance of the special 
conditions that might exist at local level. Its effect is that, in 
recognition of the status of the ECtHR as a supranational court, 
the ECtHR will refrain from laying down strict, universally 
applicable principles. Instead the ECHR confers on States a 
degree of discretion as to the means by which, or indeed the 
extent to which, they implement the Convention in domestic law. 
This doctrine is generally applied “when it comes to striking a 
balance between competing Convention rights.”50 This can create 
particular problems in controversial areas where there is a lack of 
consensus across States, such as in the interface between religious 
rights and the rights of sexual minorities.51   
 
2. The Court’s Approach to Competing Claims 
 
The ECHR does not contain any explicit protection for sexual 
minorities. Instead, the Court’s developing jurisprudence in 
relation to sexual minorities has largely fashioned what are in 
essence nondiscrimination rights, from the prohibition on 
                                                          
49 This principle requires that States are to be held primarily responsible 
for securing compliance with the ECHR, supra note 25. See generally H. 
Petzold, The Convention and the Principle of Subsidiarity, in THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (R. St. J. Macdonald, eds., 
1993). This principle is reflected in both case law under the ECHR and in 
European Union law. See Treaty on European Union, Mar. 2, 2010, 2010 
O.J. (C83/13), art. 5(3) [hereinafter TEU] (“Under the principle of 
subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or 
at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of 
the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.”). 
50 Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, 
and 3516/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881. 
51 See, e.g., Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.; Schalk v. Austria, 2010 Eur. 
Ct. H.R.  
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interferences with private life.52  As the scope for asserting the 
right to nondiscrimination in relation to sexual orientation has 
expanded, so the opportunity for a conflict between the right to 
freedom of religion and the rights to nondiscrimination has 
increased. This has resulted in the court resorting to the “margin 
of appreciation.” 
Two cases illustrate this. Both concern the right to freedom of 
religion, and the right to nondiscrimination enjoyed by sexual 
minorities. The two cases are Ladele v. United Kingdom and 
McFarlane v. United Kingdom.53 In these cases the applicants, 
both holding orthodox Christian beliefs, declined to provide 
certain services to gay and lesbian people, namely the registration 
of civil partnerships54 in Ladele, and psycho-sexual counseling in 
McFarlane. In the first case, Ladele, the applicant, Lillian 
Ladele, was a civil registrar and as such was obliged to register 
civil partnerships (the status which affords legal recognition to 
same-sex couples in the United Kingdom) as part of her job.55 
She complained of indirect discrimination when, having refused 
to engage in the registration of civil partnerships, she was 
directed to do so by her employer.56 Ladele’s refusal was 
contrary to her public authority employer’s equal opportunities 
policy, and the requirements of her job. However, she held the 
orthodox Christian belief that marriage is the union of one man 
and one woman for life and that same-sex unions are contrary to 
God’s will. She believed, therefore, that it would be wrong for 
her to participate in the creation of an institution equivalent to 
marriage (as she saw it) between a same-sex couple.57 Her claims 
failed in the domestic courts on the ground that requiring her to 
                                                          
52 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
53  Ladele and McFarlane were heard together with Eweida v. United 
Kingdom. See Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
54 This is available to same sex partners only. Civil Partnership Act, 
2004, c. 33, § 1 (U.K.). 
55 Ladele v. Islington London Borough Council, [2009] EWCA Civ. 
1357, [10] (Eng.). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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conduct civil partnerships was justified under the circumstances.58 
Ladele brought a complaint against the United Kingdom before 
the ECtHR, in reliance upon the right to freedom of religion and 
the nondiscrimination guarantee under the ECHR. The ECtHR 
accepted that her employer’s policy of requiring, without 
exception, that all registrars of births, marriages, and deaths be 
designated civil partnership registrars had a particularly 
detrimental impact on her because of her religious beliefs and that 
it was therefore, prima facie, indirectly discriminatory. However, 
that was not sufficient to make the requirement unlawful.  
As with the right to manifest religious belief, the ECtHR held 
that in order to determine whether her employer’s policy violated 
the nondiscrimination guarantee, it was necessary to decide 
whether the policy was justified as pursuing a legitimate aim, and 
was proportionate.59 The ECtHR noted that the aim of the policy 
was not limited to providing a service which was effective in 
terms of practicality and efficiency. It was also to ensure 
compliance with the employer’s overarching policy of being 
“wholly committed to the promotion of equal opportunities and to 
requiring all its employees to act in a way which does not 
discriminate against others.”60 The ECtHR held that same-sex 
couples are in a similar situation to different-sex couples with 
regard to their need for legal recognition and protection of their 
relationships, and were thus in an analogous situation to couples 
seeking to marry. In those circumstances, the ECtHR considered 
that the aim pursued by the policy was legitimate.61 Further, 
following its own case law, the court held that differences in 
treatment based on sexual orientation require particularly serious 
reasons if they are to be justified. The ECtHR concluded that 
notwithstanding the serious impact on Ladele (the loss of her 
job), her employer and the domestic courts, which had rejected 
her discrimination claim, had not exceeded the margin of 
appreciation afforded to them, and accordingly there was no 
                                                          
58 Id. at [3]. 
59 Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 104. 
60 Id. at para. 105. 
61 Id. 
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breach of the Convention rights.62   
In McFarlane, the applicant, Gary McFarlane, was employed 
by a private enterprise providing relationship counseling and 
psycho-sexual counseling. Contrary to the policies of his 
employer, McFarlane refused to provide sexual counseling to 
same-sex couples because of his Christian beliefs. Consequently, 
he was dismissed from his employment. According to the 
ECtHR, as in Ladele, the most important factor to be taken into 
account was the fact that the employer’s action was intended to 
secure the implementation of its policy of providing services 
without discrimination. The court held that State authorities 
enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation in deciding where to strike 
the balance between the right to manifest religious belief and the 
employer’s interest in securing the rights of others. This meant 
that the United Kingdom was not in breach of the Convention in 
failing to ensure a remedy for McFarlane’s dismissal. As with 
Ladele, the domestic courts had not exceeded the margin of 
appreciation available to them.63   
The question left unanswered by these cases is whether the 
margin of appreciation would have been exceeded if the domestic 
courts had decided otherwise: that is, that the refusal to provide 
services to same-sex couples was protected by the right to 
freedom of religion and that any decision requiring the applicants 
to deliver such services was unlawful. Whether the right to 
manifest religious belief would trump the nondiscrimination rights 
of women, and gay men and lesbians is of particular concern in 
the United Kingdom, given the role of religion, and specifically 
Christianity, in public life. Unfortunately, the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR does not provide any clear framework for addressing 
this issue in controversial cases.  
 
B. Human Rights Act 1998 
 
The ECHR has been to a large extent transposed into United 
Kingdom domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”), 
                                                          
62 Id. at para. 106. 
63 Id. at para. 109. 
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a purely domestic statute. The HRA now allows persons who 
allege that their “Convention rights”64 have been violated to bring 
claims in the domestic courts, where previously a complainant 
could only vindicate those rights by an application to the 
ECtHR.65 The coming into force of the HRA has given greater 
prominence to the ECHR within the domestic legal order and has 
raised society’s consciousness with regard to the rights it 
protects. This has resulted in a great deal of case law on matters 
touching upon the issue of religious freedom.  
The HRA does not give the Convention rights the same 
constitutional status seen in the Bills of Rights and other 
constitutional instruments in jurisdictions elsewhere.66  However, 
it does provide remedies to victims of a violation of the 
Convention rights.67 Further, although it does not permit the 
striking down of primary legislation,68 the HRA requires that 
legislation “be read and given effect in a way which is compatible 
with the Convention rights” so far as it is possible to do so.69 
Further, while the Convention rights, both as a matter of 
international law and domestic law, bind only public authorities, 
a court is treated as a public authority for these purposes.70 This 
                                                          
64 See Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 7 (U.K.). These Convention 
rights art.s 2–12, 14, 1–18; First Protocol, articles 1–3; and Thirteenth 
Protocol, article 1. 
65 The Human Rights Act 1998 c. 42 does not preclude an applicant from 
pursuing an application to the ECtHR once all domestic remedies have been 
exhausted. See ECHR, supra note 25, art. 35.  
66 It does not allow, therefore, for the striking down of legislation 
incompatible with the Convention rights as would be common in Bills of 
Rights and constitutional instruments.  
67 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 7 (U.K.). 
68 This ensures that the operation of the Human Rights Act 1998 does not 
result in any challenge to the primacy of Parliament. It allows, however, for 
the making of a declaration of incompatibility and provides an expeditious 
route to amending the law in view of that incompatibility, but it does not 
invalidate the law in the meantime or compel Parliament to amend it. Id. § 4. 
69 Id. § 3. 
70 Id. §§ 6(1), 6(3). 
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gives the Convention rights significant horizontal impact.71 
As the HRA is a domestic legal measure, the doctrine of a 
“margin of appreciation” does not apply to a ruling made under it 
by the United Kingdom courts. This is for the obvious reason that 
it is the State to which any “margin” is accorded, and the 
principle operates only at supranational level. However, the 
courts have shown a willingness to afford a degree of respect to 
acts of the legislature (particularly recent ones).72 As one member 
of the Supreme Court73 put it:  
[W]hen we can reasonably predict that [the 
ECtHR] would regard the matter as within the 
margin of appreciation left to the member 
states . . . [the Court] should not attempt to second 
guess the conclusion which Parliament has 
reached. I do not think that this has to do with the 
subject matter of the issue, whether it be moral, 
social, economic or libertarian; it has to do with 
keeping pace with the [ECtHR] jurisprudence as it 
develops over time, neither more nor less.74   
This approach has proved to be just as significant 
domestically as the doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” in 
the ECtHR, especially where strongly contested matters are in 
issue. When the legislature has chosen a particular course in an 
area of controversy, the courts will tend to avoid second-guessing 
the legislature’s decision, particularly where it is presumed that 
the ECtHR would not interfere if it were the subject of challenge 
there.  This has broad ramifications, but is specifically relevant to 
domestic equality laws protecting sexual minorities and the 
                                                          
71 By which it is meant that it impacts on private parties (through the 
decisions of the courts), as well as State actors. See generally CLAYTON & 
TOMLINSON, supra note 48. 
72 R v. Attorney General (Countryside Alliance), [2007] UKHL 52 [47], 
[125]–[127] (appeal taken from Eng.); Wilson v. First Cnty. Trust No. 2, 
[2003] UKHL 40 [70] (appeal taken from Eng.); R v. Secretary of State for 
Educ. & Emp’t, [2005] UKHL15 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
73 Then sitting as a committee of the House of Lords (before the 
enactment of the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005). 
74 Countryside Alliance, [2007] UKHL 52 at [126]. 
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legality of exemptions directed at accommodating religious belief. 
In short, the courts will be reluctant to interfere with any 
legislative expression by Parliament as to the balance between 
competing rights. The impact of this is considered in Section III 
below. 
 
C.  European Union Law 
 
Protection for religious belief and practice in the United 
Kingdom today is in large part derived from European Union 
(“EU”) law.  There are both similarities and differences as 
between the protections afforded by the ECHR and EU law. EU 
law, like the ECHR, guarantees the rights to freedom of religion 
and to nondiscrimination but these rights are only operative in 
situations covered by EU law, unlike the ECHR which is of 
broader impact.75  
The EU Treaties regulating the European Union76 contain 
equality guarantees,77 as does some secondary legislation under 
the Treaties.78 Importantly too, the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights79 guarantees the right to freedom of religion80 
                                                          
75 In addition, the general impact of EU law even within those parameters 
may be narrower than the ECHR in some circumstances, see, for example, 
Association de médiation sociale v. Union locale des syndicats CGT (Union 
départementale CGT des Bouches-du-Rhône and another intervening), [2014] 
WLR (D) 2. 
76 TEU, supra note 49; Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
Mar. 2, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C83/47) [hereinafter TFEU]. 
77 See, e.g., TEU, supra note 49, art. 2; TFEU, supra note 76, arts. 10, 
18, 19, 45, 153(1)(i)–(j), 157. 
78 See, e.g., Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 303) (EC) 
(“establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation”); Council Directive 2004/113/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 373) (EC) 
(“implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in 
the access to and supply of goods and services”); Council Directive 
2006/54/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 204) (EC) (“implement[ing] [] the principle of 
equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation”). 
79 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 10, 2000 
O.J. (C 364/01). 
80  Id. at art. 10. 
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and to nondiscrimination.81 The nondiscrimination provisions in 
the various EU legal instruments address discrimination across a 
number of grounds, including religion, gender, and sexual 
orientation. Some address the concept of discrimination in an 
open-textured way, while some adopt more formalistic meanings 
of discrimination.82   
The system of legal rules that flows from the United 
Kingdom’s accession to the European Economic Community 
(“EEC”), now the EU, means that EU law is of very great 
importance to both the interpretation and application of domestic 
equality law and confers, in some cases, directly effective83 
nondiscrimination rights upon individuals.  
 
 D.  Equality Act 2010 
 
Finally, the United Kingdom’s Equality Act 2010 (“Act”) 
outlaws discrimination in certain spheres, on the grounds of 
religion or belief, gender, gender reassignment, and sexual 
orientation.84 The Act is more prescriptive than the ECHR and 
some parts of European Union law. It enacts closely formulated 
concepts of discrimination, and to a significant degree the 
legislature has decreed within it when an interference with the 
right of an individual or group to be free from discrimination is 
justified,85 leaving the courts with little or no discretion. This 
                                                          
81 Id. at art. 21. 
82 Compare id. (adopting in essence the same model as that seen in the 
nondiscrimination clause under the ECHR, as to which see supra note 42 and 
accompanying text), with Council Directive 2006/54/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 204) 
(EC) (prescribing closely the forms of discrimination it regulates). For the 
E.U.’s External Action and the potential for friction between the right to 
freedom of religion belief and the rights of sexual minorities, see Pasquale 
Annicchino, The New Guidelines on Freedom of Religion and LGBTI Rights 
in the External Action of the European Union, 6 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 624 
(2013). 
83 See KARON MONAGHAN, MONAGHAN ON EQUALITY LAW 68 (2d ed. 
2013) for a full discussion. 
84 See Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, pt. 2, § 4 (UK). The Equality Act also 
protects against discrimination on other grounds. Id.  
85 See Bull v. Hall, [2013] UKSC 73, [16] (observations of Lady Hale). 
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occurs in a number of areas but in particular at the interface 
between gender and sexual orientation, and religion, as discussed 
below. 
The concept of “religion”86 is given wide reach under the Act. 
The Explanatory Notes to the Act, reflecting the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR, state that “[i]t is a broad definition in line with the 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion guaranteed by . . . 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The main 
limitation . . . . is that the religion must have a clear structure 
and belief system.”87 The Explanatory Notes observe that all the 
main religious groups are covered, including the Baha’i faith, 
Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, 
Rastafarianism, Sikhism, and Zoroastrianism, as well as 
denominations or sects within a religion, such as Protestants and 
Catholics within Christianity.88 The domestic courts have held 
that a belief that homosexual activity is “sinful,”89 a belief that 
children should not be placed for adoption with same-sex 
couples,90 and a belief that marriage is the union of one man and 
one woman for life (and as such enabling same-sex unions to be 
formed is contrary to God’s instructions), are all protected beliefs 
when they form part of a broader Christian faith.91   
The concept of discrimination92 adopted by the Act, however, 
                                                          
86 Equality Act, 2010, c.15, pt. 2, c. 1, § 10 (UK). 
87 Id. cmt. 51. 
88 Id. cmts. 51–53. 
89 See McFarlane v. Relate Avon Ltd., [2010] EWCA Civ 771 (refusing 
permission to appeal from the Employment Appeal Tribunal that proceeded on 
the same assumption: [2010] ICR 507). See also R (John & Johns) v. Derby 
City Council, [2011] EWHC 375, [6] (Admin) (a belief by members of the 
Pentecostal Church that sexual relations other than those within marriage 
between one man and one woman were morally wrong and a belief, therefore, 
that homosexuality was “against God’s laws and morals”). 
90 McClintock v. Dep’t of Constitutional Affairs, [2008] IRLR 29. 
91 Islington London Borough Council v. Ladele, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 
1357. In Eweida, the ECtHR proceeded on the same basis. See generally 
Eweida v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, and 
3516/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/ 
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881. 
92 Equality Act, 2010, c. 2, pt. 2 (UK). 
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is narrower than under the ECHR and some EU instruments.  
“Discrimination” for the purposes of the Act is defined in largely 
formalistic terms, and the Act proscribes such discrimination only 
in certain closely defined, albeit wide, circumstances, such as in 
the provision of services, the exercising of public functions, and 
in employment.93 The Act contains a number of exemptions 
applying to gender, gender reassignment and sexual orientation. 
It is by this means that the legislature has identified how in 
certain circumstances94 conflicts between the rights of different 
protected groups are to be resolved.95 As they apply to actions 
motivated by religious belief, these exemptions are very 
controversial and are seen by some as giving special privileges to 
religious individuals and organizations. Addressing potential 
conflicts through specific and closely circumscribed exemptions 
does have the virtue of certainty. However, as is discussed under 
Sections III and IV below, that certainty comes at the expense of 
full equality for women and sexual minorities whose rights are 
sometimes subordinated to claims to religious freedom. 
 
III. PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AGAINST 
DISCRIMINATORY ACTS MOTIVATED BY RELIGIOUS BELIEF  
 
There are, then, four distinct legal schemes addressing 
equality and nondiscrimination in the United Kingdom. These 
schemes provide for fairly comprehensive, albeit not always 
coherent, protections. They also do not stand in isolation since 
each informs the other. The meaning to be afforded the various 
expressions under the Equality Act 2010 will so far as possible 
conform to EHCR law because the HRA requires as much.96 In 
addition, a considerable amount of EU law is directly effective in 
the United Kingdom97 even without transposing legislation, and in 
                                                          
93 Id. pts. 3, 5 (UK). 
94 The Court has a role in other circumstances. See id. § 19. In particular, 
where a complaint is made of indirect discrimination, it is left to the courts to 
determine whether there is justification for any prima facie discrimination. Id. 
95 Id. at sch. 9, para 2; sch. 3, para. 29; sch. 22, para. 3; sch. 23, para. 2. 
96 Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, § 3 (UK). 
97 European Communities Act, 1972, c. 68, § 2 (UK). 
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any event may require that existing domestic legislation be 
construed compatibly with it. 98 The EU is about to become a 
member of the Council of Europe99 and will accede to the ECHR. 
Further, the EU is bound to act in accordance with the ECHR, 
the contents of which now comprise general principles of EU 
law.100  The Court of Justice of the European Union and the 
ECtHR have anyway long since taken account of each other’s 
jurisprudence in formulating their own case law. 
Taken together these legal schemes ensure that religious 
freedoms are robustly protected in the United Kingdom. But these 
legal instruments also protect against gender and sexual 
orientation discrimination. Refusing to provide employment or 
services to a woman, a gay man, a lesbian, or a transgendered 
person because of their status as such, is made unlawful under the 
ECHR,101 EU law,102 and the Equality Act 2010.103 This creates 
friction since the expression of religious belief may well impair 
the enjoyment of the equality rights of women, gay men, 
lesbians, or transgendered persons. 
As domestic case law has made clear, “religious conviction is 
not a solvent of legal obligation.”104 This does not mean, 
however, that freedom of religion must always give way to 
competing rights; this is certainly not the case. There are 
                                                          
98 The system of legal rules that flow from the UK’s accession to what 
was then the European Economic Community (“EEC”), now the EU, is 
complex but the impact of EU law on domestic law largely derives from 
Section 2 of the European Communities Act. Id. 
99 TEU, supra note 76, art. 6(2). 
100 See, e.g., id. art. 6; Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J (L 303) 
1, 4 (EU); Council Directive 2004/113/EC, 2004 O.J (L 373) 1, 2 (EU); 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, 2010, O.J. (L364) pmbl. (EU). 
101 ECHR, supra note 25, arts. 8, 14. 
102 Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J (L 303) 1,4 (EU); Council 
Directive 2004/113/EC, 2004 O.J (L 373) 1, 2 (EU); Council Directive 
2006/54/EC, 2006 O.J. (L 204); Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, 
art. 21, 2000 O.J. (L364) 13. 
103 Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, §§ 4, 29, 39 (UK). 
104 R (Williamson) v. Secretary of State for Educ. & Emp’t, [2005] 2 
A.C. 246 [58] (citing Church of the New Faith v. Comr. of Pay-Roll Tax, 154 
CLR 120 [136] (1983)). 
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numerous examples where religious beliefs are accommodated 
even where that impinges on the rights of women and sexual 
minorities. This is sometimes explicitly provided for in 
legislation, and at other times it occurs through the interpretation 
(or perhaps stretching) of legislation in such a way as to 
accommodate religious belief. This allows those motivated by 
religious beliefs “to be true to their beliefs while remaining 
respectful of the law.”105 
Examples abound: The Abortion Act 1967 makes abortion 
lawful in certain circumstances and at the same time excuses a 
person from “participat[ing] in any treatment” authorized by the 
1967 Act to which they have a conscientious objection.106 The 
recent case of Doogan v. NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde Health 
Board107 broadly interprets the conscientious objection clause. 
According to the court in Doogan, the clause extends not only to 
the actual medical or surgical termination but to the “whole 
process of treatment” given for that purpose.108 In Doogan, two 
Catholic midwives succeeded in their claim that in addition to 
refusing to participate in the conducting of an abortion, they were 
entitled to refuse to carry out supervisory and management 
responsibilities in relation to staff assisting in abortions, and 
could refuse to participate in the provision of care to patients 
undergoing abortions at any stage in the process.109 There are 
serious practical consequences in permitting senior midwives to 
refuse to engage in any activity connected, however remotely, 
with the carrying out of abortions.110 Nevertheless, the court 
                                                          
105 Doogan v. NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde Health Bd., [2013] CSIH 
36 [37]. 
106 Abortion Act, 1967, c. 87, § 4 (U.K.). 
107 Doogan, [2013] CSIH 36. 
108 Id. at [37]. 
109 Id. at [6]. 
110 Elizabeth Prochaska, Abortion and Conscientious Objection: What 
about Human Rights?, U.K. HUMAN RIGHTS BLOG (May 22, 2013), 
http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2013/05/22/comment-abortion-and-contentious-
objection-what-about-human-rights-elizabeth-prochaska/ (last visited Feb. 22, 
2014). While section 4(2) of the Abortion Act does not enable a conscientious 
objection to be raised where the mother is in danger of grave permanent injury 
or death, as Elizabeth Prochaska points out: “[T]hat is a difficult assessment to 
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chose to interpret the 1967 Act in a way that allowed the Catholic 
midwives to “to be true to their beliefs while remaining respectful 
of the law.”111 It did this by giving a meaning to the conscientious 
objection clause that extended well beyond what the 1967 Act 
appeared to intend, and beyond what the professional nursing 
bodies had until then understood the limits of the clause to be. 
Unless the decision is overturned by the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court,112 there is a real possibility that the right to 
access a legal abortion will be impeded, with the foreseeable 
attendant risk to the health and well-being of women seeking to 
terminate a pregnancy.  
Another such example is the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) 
Act 2013 (“Same Sex Marriage Act”) which made marriage 
between same-sex partners lawful, but also introduced provisions 
that prohibit same-sex marriages from being contracted on 
religious premises unless very tight conditions are met.113 The 
Same Sex Marriage Act allows for same-sex marriages on 
religious premises only where a religious organization has 
“opted-in,” in accordance with a prescribed procedure.114 
                                                          
make and a woman’s condition can deteriorate rapidly. Savita Halappanavar’s 
death shows how a system which ostensibly permitted abortion to save the 
mother’s life failed to protect her from the conscientious objection of her 
caregivers. The practical consequences of the judgment may put women at 
risk.” Id. 
111 Doogan, [2013] CSIH 36 at [37]. 
112 An appeal is currently pending before the Supreme Court under case 
number UKSC 2013/0124. 
113 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act, 2013, c. 30, § 1 (UK). 
114  The Church of England and the Catholic Church have made clear that 
they will not apply to “opt in” as per the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act of 
2013, § 3 (UK). Same-sex Marriage and the Church of England, CHURCH OF 
ENG., http://www.churchofengland.org/our-views/marriage,-family-and-
sexuality-issues/same-sex-marriage/same-sex-marriage-and-the-church-of-
england-an-explanatory-note.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). The bar on civil 
partnerships being conducted on religious premises has been lifted for those 
religious groups who seek permission to have their premises approved for the 
registration of civil partnerships. See Marriages and Civil Partnerships 
(Approved Premises) (Amend.) Regulations 2011, SI 2011/2661 (amending SI 
2005/3168) (UK). So far, the Society of Friends (Quakers), Spiritualists, 
Unitarians, and the United Reformed Church have applied. The mainstream 
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Further, the Same Sex Marriage Act strictly prohibits a person 
being compelled by any means (including by the enforcement of a 
contract or a statutory or other legal requirement) to conduct a 
same-sex marriage according to religious rites. This is so even 
where those persons have the authority to conduct a marriage and 
are members of a religious organization that has “opted in.”115 
Also, as mentioned, the Equality Act 2010 contains 
exemptions privileging religion in certain cases. For example, it 
allows an employer to require that in order to be hired for a 
particular job, a person must be of a particular sex; must not be a 
transsexual person; must not be married or a civil partner, or 
must not be of a specified sexual orientation. This is permitted 
where (i) the employer can show that the employment is for the 
“purposes of an organised religion;” (ii) the application of the 
requirement engages “the compliance or non-conflict principle,” 
and (iii) the person to whom the requirement is applied does not 
meet it, or (save in relation to sex) the person applying the 
requirement has reasonable grounds for not being satisfied that 
the person meets it.116  
The “compliance principle” is engaged where a requirement 
is applied so as to comply with the doctrines of the religion 
concerned. The “non-conflict principle” is engaged where, 
because of the nature or context of the employment, the 
requirement is applied so as to avoid conflicting with the strongly 
held religious convictions of a significant number of the religion’s 
followers.117 This exemption does not contain any threshold of 
proportionality,118 nor does it define what is meant by the 
expression “for the purposes of an organised religion.”119 The 
                                                          
Christian churches (the Church of England and Catholic Church, specifically) 
have indicated that they will not apply, and protections are built into the 
legislation to ensure that they will not be required to do so.  
115 Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act of 2013, § 2 (UK). 
116 Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, § 2(1)(a)–(b), sch. 9 (UK). 
117 Id. 
118 Unlike other exemptions, it is not necessary that any requirement be a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. See, e.g., id. § 1(1),  sch. 
9 (ordinary occupational requirements). 
119 See CLAYTON & TOMLINSON, supra note 48 (discussing the impact of 
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Government had intended introducing a proportionality 
requirement, and defining employment “for the purposes of an 
organised religion” as being employment wholly or mainly 
involving (a) leading or assisting in the observation of liturgical 
or ritualistic practices of a religion, or (b) promoting or 
explaining the doctrine of the religion (whether to followers of 
the religion or otherwise). The Catholic Bishops’ Conference of 
England and Wales expressed strong concern that defining 
employment for the purposes of an organized religion in that way 
“would unduly narrow the scope of the exception and limit the 
‘essential’ ability of the Church in filling posts with a pastoral 
role ‘to prefer a candidate whose life is in accordance with its 
ethos.’”120 Due to the expression of such concerns, the definition 
of relevant employment for these purposes and the proportionality 
condition were removed by amendments made in the House of 
Lords during the passage of the Equality Bill (prior to its 
enactment as the Equality Act 2010).121 The Equality Act 2010 
also exempts, in prescribed circumstances, sexual orientation 
discrimination in the provision of services by religious 
organizations,122 and it allows discrimination by religious 
ministers against women through the provision of services only to 
persons of one sex or separately for men and women.123  Wide 
exemptions also apply to faith-based schools124 (which are lawful 
in the United Kingdom as part of the State education system).125   
                                                          
Article 9 in this respect). 
120 HOUSE OF LORDS & HOUSE OF COMMONS JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS, LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: EQUALITY BILL, 26th Report, Sess. 
2008–09 at para. 166 (citing Memorandum from the Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference of England and Wales (E14) to the Public Bills Committee). 
121  Though this exemption is controversial, interference with the rights of 
sexual minorities in consequence of a similar exemption under earlier 
Regulations was found to be lawful. See, e.g., R (on the application of 
Amicus-MSF Section) v. Secretary of State for Trade & Indus., [2004] IRLR 
430. 
122 Equality Act, 2010, c. 15, § 2, sch. 9 (UK). 
123 Id. § 29, sch. 3. 
124 Those being schools having a “religious character.” See School 
Standards and Framework Act, 1998, c.31, §§ 20–83 (UK). 
125 Equality Act 2010, c. 15. § 5, sch. 11; see also id. § 11, sch. 3.  
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Where domestic statutory law prohibits discrimination against 
women or sexual minorities, then unless there is an exemption for 
those whose acts are motivated by religious belief, or there is a 
need to accommodate those beliefs under the ECHR, such 
discrimination will be unlawful whatever the motivation for it. 
This is illustrated by the case of Bull v. Hall.126 In Bull, the 
United Kingdom Supreme Court found that a couple operating a 
small hotel had acted unlawfully in refusing a double-bedded 
room to a same-sex couple in a civil partnership.127 This was 
because the law prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, as it 
does religious discrimination, in the provision of hotel 
accommodation and related services. This is without exception 
for private profit-making businesses run along religious lines. 
The fact that the discrimination was motivated by the hotel 
owners’ orthodox Christian belief “that the only divinely ordained 
sexual relationship is that between a man and a woman within 
bonds of matrimony,”128 did not rescue the hoteliers. As the 
Supreme Court held, finding that the hoteliers had acted 
unlawfully was simply to treat them equally to all other hoteliers. 
If the claimants in Bull, the same-sex couple seeking a room, ran 
a hotel and denied a double room to the defendants on the ground 
of their Christian beliefs, they too would have been acting 
unlawfully.129 Neither group was privileged in law in this context.  
However, this does little to abate concerns about those cases 
where the law does prioritize religious belief over equality for 
women and sexual minorities. 
 
IV. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: A MINORITY RIGHT OR A MAJORITARIAN 
CLAIM? 
  
Religion may not be the solvent of all legal obligation but, as 
                                                          
126 Bull v. Hall, [2013] UKSC 73 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
127 The Justices gave different reasons for so holding. Compare id. at 
[24]–[30] (discussing the impact of the couple being in a civil partnership on 
the conclusion reached), with id. at [74]–[76] (Neuberger, L., concurring) 
(disagreeing as to the significance of a civil partnership). 
128 Id. at [9]. 
129 See id. at [4], [54] (comments by Lady Hale). 
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the discussion above demonstrates, it can serve to avoid it, at 
least where women and sexual minorities are concerned.130 This is 
either because Parliament has enacted statutory exceptions 
applicable in cases where discriminatory acts are motivated by 
religious belief, or because the HRA (or the ECHR) will require 
that a particular religious belief be accommodated. Given the 
privileged space occupied by religion in the United Kingdom and, 
in the case of the Church of England, its legislature, this is 
perhaps of little surprise.  
It is a peculiarity, however, that though the vast majority of 
the population of the United Kingdom self-identify as “Christian” 
(73.8%),131 the official law reports and mainstream media reports 
indicate that claimants in religious discrimination cases are 
overwhelmingly likely to be Christian where a “clash” with 
another’s nondiscrimination rights is engaged. This is most 
notably the case where the conflict concerns religion on the one 
hand, and gender or sexual orientation on the other.132 Christians 
can barely be said to comprise a minority group by any 
measurement, whether in actual numbers, or by distribution of 
                                                          
130 This would not be tolerated if the discrimination were race-based. R 
(E) v. Governing Body of JFS, [2009] UKSC 15, [33]–[46] (appeal taken from 
Eng.). See Timeshev v. Russia, 2005-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 169, 187 (holding 
that “no difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a decisive 
extent on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified”). In 
the context of religion, this prospect is not fanciful. A number of 
predominantly U.S.-based “Christian” churches including the “Christian 
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan,” “Aryan Nations,” and a variety of other 
churches within the “Christian Identity” movement advocate white 
supremacism and anti-Semitism. 
131 EQUALITY & HUM. RIGHTS COMM’N, HOW FAIR IS BRITAIN? 
EQUALITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND GOOD RELATIONS IN 2010, at 63 (2010), 
available at http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/uploaded_files/triennial_ 
review/how_fair_is_britain_-_complete_report.pdf. 
132 See, e.g., R (Core Issues Trust) v. Transp. for London, [2013] EWHC 
651 (Admin); [2014] EWCA Civ 34; Bull v. Hall, [2013] UKSC 73; Eweida 
v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10, and 3516/10, 
2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/ 
search.aspx?i=001-115881; Doogan v. NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde Health 
Bd., [2013] CSIH 36 [37]; Black v. Wilkinson, [2013] EWCA Civ 820; R 
(John & Johns) v. Derby City Council, [2011] EWHC 375 [6] (Admin).  
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power or privilege. This distinguishes this group of claimants 
from the usual claimant profile in discrimination claims. Women 
make up the vast majority of claimants in sex discrimination 
claims; gay men and lesbians in sexual orientation claims; and so 
on, for obvious historical and structural reasons. Women, gay 
men, and lesbians generally call on the law to remedy 
disadvantage experienced by them. However, certainly some 
Christian claimants pursuing religious discrimination claims 
might instead be said to be calling on the law to ensure that their 
privileged place in the public life of the United Kingdom is not 
displaced.  
The dominance of Christianity in the United Kingdom’s 
constitutional settlement, perhaps inevitably, obstructs the 
achievement of full equality for women and sexual minorities. 
Until the United Kingdom’s formal Head of State and legislature 
discard their anachronistic ties to the Church of England, it is 
likely that those whose gender or sexual orientation are not 
accorded equal respect133 in the Church’s theology and institutions 
of power will find their equality rights subordinated to the 
demands of Christianity. This is harmful to women and sexual 
minorities. However, the continuance of the status quo, though 
conflicting with all modern concepts of liberal, pluralistic 
democracy seems likely for some time. There is a political 
feebleness about tackling the Church of England and the place of 
Christianity in public life, and none of the mainstream parties 
have indicated any intention to do so. There are no present 
proposals to disestablish the Church of England or to otherwise 
reduce the influence of religion, in particular Christianity, in 
public life. This is a matter of considerable regret to many.  
 
                                                          
133 Equal respect must ultimately mean equal treatment. 
